Antifederalist No. 52 ON THE GUARANTEE OF CONGRESSIONAL BIENNIAL ELECTIONS
The following essay was signed by Consider Arms, Malichi Maynard, and Samuel
Field. It was taken from The Hampshire Gazette of April 9, 1788.
We the subscribers being of the number, who did not assent to the
ratification of the federal constitution, under consideration in the late state
convention, held at Boston, to which we were called by the suffrages of the
corporations to which we respectively belong-beg leave, through the channel of
your paper, to lay before the public in general, and our constituents in
particular, the reasons of our dissent, and the principles which governed us in
our decision of this important question.
Fully convinced, ever since the late revolution, of the necessity of a firm,
energetic government, we should have rejoiced in an opportunity to have given
our assent to such a one; and should in the present case, most cordially have
done it, could we at the same time been happy to have seen the liberties of the
people and the rights of mankind properly guarded and secured. We conceive that
the very notion of government carries along with it the idea of justice and
equity, and that the whole design of instituting government in the world, was to
preserve men's properties from rapine, and their bodies from violence and
bloodshed.
These propositions being established, we conceive must of necessity produce
the following consequence: That every constitution or system, which does not
quadrate with this original design, is not government, but in fact a subversion
of it.
Having premised thus much, we proceed to mention some things in this
constitution to which we object, and to enter into an inquiry, whether, and how
far they coincide with those simple and original notions of government before
mentioned.
In the first place, as direct taxes are to be apportioned according to the
numbers in each state, and as Massachusetts has none in it but what are declared
free men, so the whole, blacks as well as whites, must be numbered; this must
therefore operate against us, as two-fifths of the slaves in the southern states
are to be left out of the numeration. Consequently, three Massachusetts infants
will increase the tax equal to five sturdy full-grown Negroes of theirs, who
work every day in the week for their masters, saving the Sabbath, upon which
they are allowed to get something for their own support. We can see no justice
in this way of apportioning taxes. Neither can we see any good reason why this
was consented to on the part of our delegates.
We suppose it next to impossible that every individual in this vast
continental union, should have his wish with regard to every single article
composing a frame of government. And therefore, although we think it More
agreeable to the principles of republicanism, that elections should be annual,
yet as the elections in our own state government are so, we did not view it so
dangerous to the liberties of the people, that we should have rejected the
constitution merely on account of the biennial elections of the
representatives-had we been sure that the people have any security even of this.
But this we could not find. For although it is said, that "the House of
Representatives shall be chosen every second year, by the people of the several
states," etc., and that "the times, places and manner of holding
elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by
the legislature thereof," yet all this is wholely superseded by a
subsequent provision, which empowers Congress at any time to enact a law,
whereby such regulations may be altered, except as to the places of choosing
senators. Here we conceive the people may be very materially injured, and in
time reduced to a state of as abject vassalage as any people were under the
control of the most mercenary despot that ever tarnished the pages of history.
The depravity of human nature, illustrated by examples from history, will
warrant us to say, it may be possible, if not probable, that the congress may be
composed of men, who will wish to burden and oppress the people. In such case,
will not their inventions be fruitful enough to devise occasions for postponing
the elections? And if they can do this once, they can twice; if they can twice,
they can thrice, so by degrees render themselves absolute and perpetual. Or, if
they choose, they have another expedient. They can alter the place of holding
elections. They can say, whatever the legislature of this state may order to
the contrary, that all the elections of our representatives shall be made at
Mechias, or at Williamstown. Consequently, nine- tenths of the people will
never vote. And if this should be thought a measure favorable to their
reelection, or the election of some tool for their mercenary purposes, we doubt
not it will be thus ordered. But says the advocates for the constitution, "it
is not likely this will ever happen; we are not to expect our rulers will ever
proceed to a wanton exercise of the powers given them." But what reason
have we more than past ages, to expect that we shall be blessed with impeccable
rulers? We think not any. Although it has been said that every generation
grows wiser and wiser, yet we have no reason to think they grow better and
better. And therefore the probability lies upon the dark side. Does not the
experience of past ages leach, that men have generally exercised all the powers
they had given them, and even have usurped upon them, in order to accomplish
their own sinister and avaricious designs, whenever they thought they could do
it with impunity? This we presume will not be denied. And it appeared to us
that the arguments made use of by the favorers of the constitution, in the late
convention at Boston, proceeded upon the plan of righteousness in those who are
to rule over us, by virtue of this new form of government. But these arguments,
we confess, could have no weight with us, while we judge them to be founded
altogether upon a slippery perhaps.
We are sensible, that in order to the due administration of government, it
is necessary that certain powers should be delegated to the rulers from the
people. At the same time, we think they ought carefully to guard against giving
so much as will enable those rulers, by that means, at once, or even in process
of time, to render themselves absolute and despotic. This we think is the case
with the form of government lately submitted to our consideration. We could
not, therefore, acting uprightly, consulting our own good and the good of our
constituents, give our assent unto it. We could not then and we still cannot
see, that because people are many times guilty of crimes and deserving of
punishment, that it from thence follows the authority ought to have power to
punish them when they are not guilty, or to punish the innocent with the guilty
without discrimination, which amounts to the same thing. But this we think in
fact to be the case as to this federal constitution. For the congress, whether
they have provocation or not, can at any time order the elections in any or all
the states to be conducted in such manner as wholely to defeat and render
entirely nugatory the intention of those elections, and convert that which was
considered and intended to be the palladium of the liberties of the people-the
grand bulwark against any invasion upon them-into a formidable engine, by which
to overthrow them all, and thus involve them in the depth of misery and
distress. But it was pled by some of the ablest advocates of the constitution,
that if congress should exercise such powers to the prejudice of the people (and
they did not deny but they could if they should be disposed) they (the people)
would not suffer it. They would have recourse to the ultima ratio, the dernier
resort of the oppressed-the sword.
But it appeared to us a piece of superlative incongruity indeed, that the
people, whilst in the full and indefeasible possession of their liberties and
privileges, should be so very profuse, so very liberal in the disposal of them,
as consequently to place themselves in a predicament miserable to an extreme.
So wretched indeed, that they may at once be reduced to the sad alternative of
yielding themselves vassals into the hands of a venal and corrupt
administration, whose only wish may be to aggrandize themselves and families-to
wallow in luxury and every species of dissipation, and riot upon the spoils of
the community; or take up the sword and involve their country in all the horrors
of a civil war-the consequences of which, we think, we may venture to augur will
more firmly rivet their shackles and end in the entailment of vassalage to their
posterity. We think this by no means can fall within the description of
government before mentioned. Neither can we think these suggestions merely
chimerical, or that they proceed from an overheated enthusiasm in favor of
republicanism; neither yet from an illplaced detestation of aristocracy; but
from the apparent danger the people are in by establishing this constitution.
When we take a forward view of the proposed congress-seated in the federal city,
ten miles square, fortified and replenished with all kinds of military stores
and every implement; with a navy at command on one side, and a land army on the
other-we say, when we view them thus possessed of the sword in one hand and the
purse strings of the people in the other, we can see no security left for them
in the enjoyment of their liberties, but what may proceed from the bare
possibility that this supreme authority of the nation may be possessed of virtue
and integrity sufficient to influence them in the administration of equal
justice and equity among those whom they shall govern. But why should we
voluntarily choose to trust our all upon so precarious a tenure as this? We
confess it gives us pain to anticipate the future scene: a scene presenting to
view miseries so complicated and extreme, that it may be part of the charms of
eloquence to extenuate, or the power of art to remove.
CONSIDER ARMS
MALICHI MAYNARD
SAMUEL FIELD
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