Antifederalist No. 63 ON THE ORGANIZATION AND POWERS OF THE SENATE (PART
2)
. . . . The senate is an assembly of 26 members, two from each state; though
the senators are apportioned on the federal plan, they will vote individually.
They represent the states, as bodies politic, sovereign to certain purposes.
The states being sovereign and independent, are all considered equal, each with
the other in the senate. In this we are governed solely by the ideal equalities
of sovereignties; the federal and state governments forming one whole, and the
state governments an essential part, which ought always to be kept distinctly in
view, and preserved. I feel more disposed, on reflection, to acquiesce in
making them the basis of the senate, and thereby to make it the interest and
duty of the senators to preserve distinct, and to perpetuate the respective,
sovereignties they shall represent. . . .
The senate, as a legislative branch, is not large, but as an executive
branch quite too numerous. It is not to be presumed that we can form a genuine
senatorial branch in the United States, a real representation of the aristocracy
and balance in the legislature, any more than we can form a genuine
representation of the people. Could we separate the aristocratical and
democratical interest, compose the senate of the former, and the house of
assembly of the latter, they are too unequal in the United States to produce a
balance. Form them on pure principles, and leave each to be supported by its
real weight and connections, the senate would be feeble and the house powerful.
I say, on pure principles; because I make a distinction between a senate that
derives its weight and influence from a pure source-its numbers and wisdom, its
extensive property, its extensive and permanent connections -and a senate
composed of a few men, possessing small property, and small and unstable
connections, that derives its weight and influence from a corrupt or pernicious
source: that is, merely from the power given it by the constitution and laws, to
dispose of the public offices, and the annexed emoluments, and by those means to
interest officers, and the hungry expectants of offices, in support of its
measures. I wish the proposed senate may not partake too much of the latter
description.
To produce a balance and checks, the constitution proposes two branches in
the legislature. But they are so formed, that the members of both must
generally be the same kind of men-men having similar interests and views,
feelings and connections - men of the same grade in society, and who associate
on all, occasions (probably, if there be any difference, the senators will be
the most democratic.) Senators and representatives thus circumstanced, as men,
though convened in two rooms to make laws, must be governed generally by the
same motives and views, and therefore pursue the same system of politics. The
partitions between the two branches will be merely those of the building in
which they fit. There will not be found in them any of those genuine balances
and checks, among the real different interests, and efforts of the several
classes of men in the community we aim at. Nor can any such balances and checks
be formed in the present condition of the United States in any considerable
degree of perfection. . .
Though I conclude the senators and representatives will not form in the
legislature those balances and checks which correspond with the actual state of
the people, yet I approve of two branches, because we may notwithstanding derive
several advantages from them. The senate, from the mode of its appointment,
will probably be influenced to support the state governments; and, from its
periods of service will produce stability in legislation, while frequent
elections may take place in the other branch. There is generally a degree of
competition between two assemblies even composed of the same kind of men; and by
this, and by means of every law passing a revision in the second branch,
caution, coolness, and deliberation are produced in the business of making laws.
By means of a democratic branch we may particularly secure personal liberty;
and by means of a senatorial branch we may particularly protect property. By
the division, the house becomes the proper body to impeach all officers for
misconduct in office, and the senate the proper court to try them; and in a
country where limited powers must be lodged in the first magistrate, the senate,
perhaps, may be the most proper body to be found to have a negative upon him in
making treaties, and managing foreign affairs.
Though I agree the federal senate, in the form proposed, may be useful to
many purposes, and that it is not very necessary to alter the organization,
modes of appointment, and powers of it in several respects; yet, without
alterations in others, I sincerely believe it will, in a very few years, become
the source of the greatest evils. Some of these alterations, I conceive, to be
absolutely necessary and some of them at least advisable.
1. By the confederation the members of congress are chosen annually. By
Art. 1. Sect. 2. of the constitution, the senators shall be chosen for six
years. As the period of service must be, in a considerable degree, matter of
opinion on this head, I shall only make a few observations, to explain why I
think it more advisable to limit it to three or four years.
The people of this country have not been accustomed to so long appointments
in their state governments. They have generally adopted annual elections. The
members of the present congress are chosen yearly, who, from the nature and
multiplicity of their business, ought to be chosen for longer periods than the
federal senators. Men six years in office absolutely contract callous habits,
and cease, in too great a degree, to feel their dependence, and for the
condition of their constituents. Senators continued in offices three or four
years, will be in them longer than any popular erroneous opinions will probably
continue to actuate their electors. Men appointed for three or four years will
generally be long enough in office to give stability, and amply to acquire
political information. By a change of legislators, as often as circumstances
will permit, political knowledge is diffused more extensively among the people,
and the attention of the electors and elected more constantly kept
alive-circumstances of infinite importance in a free country. Other reasons
might be added, but my subject is too extensive to admit of my dwelling upon
less material points.
2. When the confederation was formed, it was considered essentially
necessary that the members of congress should at any time be recalled by their
respective states, when the states should see fit, and others be sent in their
room. I do not think it is less necessary that this principle should be
extended to the members of congress under the new constitution, and especially
to the senators. I have had occasion several times to observe, that let us form
a federal constitution as extensively, and on the best principles in our power,
we must, after all, trust a vast deal to a few men, who, far removed from their
constituents, will administer the federal government. There is but little
danger these men will feel too great a degree of dependence. The necessary and
important object to be attended to, is to make them feel dependent enough. Men
elected for several years, several hundred miles distant from their states,
possessed of very extensive powers, and the means of paying themselves, will
not, probably, be oppressed with a sense of dependence and responsibility.
The senators will represent sovereignties, which generally have, and always
ought to retain, the power of recalling their agents. The principle of
responsibility is strongly felt in men who are liable to be recalled and
censured for their misconduct; and, if we may judge from experience, the latter
will not abuse the power of recalling their members; to possess it will at least
be a valuable check. It is in the nature of all delegated power, that the
constituents should retain the right to judge concerning the conduct of their
representatives. They must exercise the power, and their decision itself, their
approving or disapproving that conduct implies a right, a power to continue in
office, or to remove from it. But whenever the substitute acts under a
constitution, then it becomes necessary that the power of recalling him be
expressed. The reasons for lodging a power to recall are stronger, as they
respect the senate, than as they respect the representatives. The latter will
be more frequently elected, and changed of course, and being chosen by the
people at large, it would be more difficult for the people than for the
legislatures to take the necessary measures for recalling. But even the people,
if the powers will be more beneficial to them than injurious, ought to possess
it. The people are not apt to wrong a man who is steady and true to their
interests. They may for a while be misled by party representations, and leave a
good man out of office unheard; but every recall supposes a deliberate decision,
and a fair hearing. And no man who believes his conduct proper, and the result
of honest views, will be the less useful in his public character on account of
the examination his actions may be liable to. A man conscious of the contrary
conduct ought clearly to be restrained by the apprehensions of a trial. I
repeat it, it is interested combinations and factions we are particularly to
guard against in the federal government, and all the rational means that can be
put into the hands of the people to prevent them ought to be provided and
furnished for them. Where there is a power to recall, trusty sentinels among
the people, or in the state legislatures will have a fair opportunity to become
useful. If the members in congress from the states join in such combinations,
or favor them, or pursue a pernicious line of conduct, the most attentive among
the people or in the state legislatures may formally charge them before their
constituents. The very apprehensions of such constitutional charge may prevent
many of the evils mentioned; and the recalling the members of a single state, a
single senator or representative, may often prevent many more. Nor do 1, at
present, discover any danger in such proceedings, as every man who shall move
for a recall will put his reputation at stake, to show he has reasonable grounds
for his motion. It is not probable such motions will be made unless there be
good apparent grounds for succeeding. Nor can the charge or motion be anything
more than the attack of an individual or individuals unless a majority of the
constituents shall see cause to go into the inquiry. Further, the circumstances
of such a power being lodged in the constituents will tend continually to keep
up their watchfulness, as well as the attention and dependence of the federal
senators and representatives.
3. By the confederation it is provided, that no delegate shall serve more
than three years in any term of six years; and thus, by the forms of the
government a rotation of members is produced. A like principle has been adopted
in some of the state governments, and also in some ancient and modern republics.
Whether this exclusion of a man for a given period, after he shall have served
a given time, ought to be ingrafted into a constitution or not is a question,
the proper decision [of which] materially depends upon the leading features of
the government. Some governments are so formed as to produce a sufficient
fluctuation and change of members; in the ordinary course of elections proper
numbers of new members are from time to time brought into the legislature, and a
proportionate number of old ones go out, mix, and become diffused among the
people. This is the case with all numerous representative legislatures, the
members of which are frequently elected, and constantly within the view of their
constituents. This is the case with our state governments, and in them a
constitutional rotation is unimportant. But in a government consisting of but a
few members, elected for long periods, and far removed from the observation of
the people, but few changes in the ordinary course of elections take place among
the members. They become in some measure a fixed body, and often inattentive to
the public good, callous, selfish, and the fountain of corruption. To prevent
these evils, and to force a principle of pure animation into the federal
government, which will be formed much in this last manner mentioned, and to
produce attention, activity, and a diffusion of knowledge in the community, we
ought to establish among others the principle of rotation. Even good men in
office, in time, imperceptibly lose sight of the people, and gradually fall into
measures prejudicial to them. It is only a rotation among the members of the
federal legislature I shall contend for. Judges and officers at the heads of
the judicial and executive departments are in a very different situation. Their
offices and duties require the information and studies of many years for
performing them in a manner advantageous to the people. These judges and
officers must apply their whole time to the detail business of their offices,
and depend on them for their support. Then, they always act under masters or
superiors, and may be removed from office for misconduct. They pursue a certain
round of executive business; their offices must be in all societies confined to
a few men, because but few can become qualified to fill them. And were they, by
annual appointments, open to the people at large, they are offices of such a
nature as to be of no service to them. They must leave these offices in the
possession of the few individuals qualified to fill them, or have them badly
filled. In the judicial and executive departments also, the body of the people
possess a large share of power and influence, as jurors and subordinate
officers, among whom there are many and frequent rotations. But in every free
country the legislatures are all on a level, and legislation becomes partial
whenever, in practice, it rests for any considerable time in a few hands. It is
the true republican principle to diffuse the power of making the laws among the
people and so to modify the forms of the government as to draw in turn the well
informed of every class into the legislature. To determine the propriety or
impropriety of this rotation, we must take the inconveniencies as well as the
advantages attending it into view. On the one hand by this rotation, we may
sometimes exclude good men from being elected. On the other hand, we guard
against those pernicious connections, which usually grow up among men left to
continue long periods in office. We increase the number of those who make the
laws and return to their constituents; and thereby spread information, and
preserve a spirit of activity and investigation among the people. Hence a
balance of interests and exertions are preserved, and the ruinous measures of
actions rendered more impracticable. I would not urge the principle of
rotation, if I believed the consequence would be an uninformed federal
legislature; but I have no apprehension of this in this enlightened country.
The members of congress, at any one time, must be but very few compared with the
respectable well informed men in the United States; and I have no idea there
will be any want of such men for members of congress, though by a principle of
rotation the constitution should exclude from being elected for two years those
federal legislators, who may have served the four years immediately preceding,
or any four years in the six preceding years. If we may judge from experience
and fair calculations, this principle will never operate to exclude at any one
period a fifteenth part even of those men who have been members of congress.
Though no man can sit in congress by the confederation more than three years in
any term of six years, yet not more than three, four, or five men in any one
state have been made ineligible at any one period. And if a good man happens to
be excluded by this rotation, it is only for a short time. All things
considered, the inconveniencies of the principle must be very inconsiderable
compared with the many advantages of it. It will generally be expedient for a
man who has served four years in congress to return home, mix with the people,
and reside some time with them. This will tend to reinstate him in the
interests, feelings, and views similar to theirs, and thereby confirm in him the
essential qualifications of a legislator. Even in point of information, it may
be observed, the useful information of legislators is not acquired merely in
studies in offices, and in meeting to make laws from day to day. They must
learn the actual situation of the people by being among them, and when they have
made laws, return home and observe how they operate. Thus occasionally to be
among the people, is not only necessary to prevent or banish the callous habits
and self-interested views of office in legislators, but to afford them necessary
information, and to render them useful. Another valuable end is answered by it,
sympathy, and the means of communication between them and their constituents, is
substantially promoted. So that on every principle legislators, at certain
periods, ought to live among their constituents. Some men of science are
undoubtedly necessary in every legislature; but the knowledge, generally,
necessary for men who make laws, is a knowledge of the common concerns, and
particular circumstances of the people. In a republican government seats in the
legislature are highly honorable. I believe but few do, and surely none ought
to, consider them as places of profit and permanent support. Were the people
always properly attentive, they would, at proper periods, call their lawmakers
home, by sending others in their room. But this is not often the case; and
therefore, in making constitutions, when the people are attentive, they ought
cautiously to provide for those benefits, those advantageous changes in the
administration of their affairs, which they are often apt to be inattentive to
in practice. On the whole, to guard against the evils, and to secure the
advantages I have mentioned, with the greatest degree of certainty, we ought
clearly in my opinion, to increase the federal representation, to secure
elections on proper principles, to establish a right to recall members, and a
rotation among them.
THE FEDERAL FARMER
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