Antifederalist No. 72 ON THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE; ON REELIGIBILITY OF THE
PRESIDENT
By an anonymous writer "REPUBLICUS," appearing in The Kentucky
Gazette on March 1, 1788.
. . I go now to Art. 2, Sec. 1, which vest the supreme continental
executive power in a president-in order to the choice of whom, the legislative
body of each state is empowered to point out to their constituents some mode of
choice, or (to save trouble) may choose themselves, a certain number of
electors, who shall meet in their respective states, and vote by ballot, for two
persons, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state
with themselves. Or in other words, they shall vote for two, one or both of
whom they know nothing of. An extraordinary refinement this, on the plain
simple business of election; and of which the grand convention have certainly
the honor of being the first inventors; and that for an officer too, of so much
importance as a president - invested with legislative and executive powers; who
is to be commander in chief of the army, navy, militia, etc.; grant reprieves
and pardons; have a temporary negative on all bills and resolves; convene and
adjourn both houses of congress; be supreme conservator of laws; commission all
officers; make treaties; and who is to continue four years, and is only
removable on conviction of treason or bribery, and triable only by the senate,
who are to be his own council, whose interest in every instance runs parallel
with his own, and who are neither the officers of the people, nor accountable to
them.
Is it then become necessary, that a free people should first resign their
right of suffrage into other hands besides their own, and then, secondly, that
they to whom they resign it should be compelled to choose men, whose persons,
characters, manners, or principles they know nothing of? And, after all
(excepting some such change as is not likely to happen twice in the same
century) to intrust Congress with the final decision at last? Is it necessary,
is it rational, that the sacred rights of mankind should thus dwindle down to
Electors of electors, and those again electors of other electors? This seems to
be degrading them even below the prophetical curse denounced by the good old
patriarch, on the offspring of his degenerate son: "servant of servants".
. .
Again I would ask (considering how prone mankind are to engross power, and
then to abuse it) is it not probable, at least possible, that the president who
is to be vested with all this demiomnipotence - who is not chosen by the
community; and who consequently, as to them, is irresponsible and
independent-that he, I say, by a few artful and dependent emissaries in
Congress, may not only perpetuate his own personal administration, but also make
it hereditary? By the same means, he may render his suspensive power over the
laws as operative and permanent as that of G. the 3d over the acts of the
British parliament; and under the modest title of president, may exercise the
combined authority of legislation and execution, in a latitude yet unthought of.
Upon his being invested with those powers a second or third time, he may
acquire such enormous influence-as, added to his uncontrollable power over the
army, navy, and militia; together with his private interest in the officers of
all these different departments, who are all to be appointed by himself, and so
his creatures, in the true political sense of the word; and more especially when
added to all this, he has the power of forming treaties and alliances, and
calling them to his assistance-that he may, I say, under all these advantages
and almost irresistible temptations, on some pretended pique, haughtily and
contemptuously, turn our poor lower house (the only shadow of liberty we shall
have left) out of doors, and give us law at the bayonet's point. Or, may not
the senate, who are nearly in the same situation, with respect to the people,
from similar motives and by similar means, erect themselves easily into an
oligarchy, towards which they have already attempted so large a stride? To one
of which channels, or rather to a confluence of both, we seem to be fast gliding
away; and the moment we arrive at it-farewell liberty. . . .
To conclude, I can think of but one source of right to government, or any
branch of it-and that is THE PEOPLE. They, and only they, have a right to
determine whether they will make laws, or execute them, or do both in a
collective body, or by a delegated authority. Delegation is a positive actual
investiture. Therefore if any people are subjected to an authority which they
have not thus actually chosen-even though they may have tamely submitted to
it-yet it is not their legitimate government. They are wholly passive, and as
far as they are so, are in a state of slavery. Thank heaven we are not yet
arrived at that state. And while we continue to have sense enough to discover
and detect, and virtue en(>ugh to detest and oppose every attempt, either of
force or fraud, either from without or within, to bring us into it, we never
will.
Let us therefore continue united in the cause of rational liberty. Let
unity and liberty be our mark as well as our motto. For only such an union can
secure our freedom; and division will inevitably destroy it. Thus a mountain of
sand may peace meal [sic] be removed by the feeble hands of a child; but if
consolidated into a rock, it mocks the united efforts of mankind, and can only
fall in a general wreck of nature.
REPUBLICUS
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