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The Federalist No. 30
Concerning the General Power of Taxation
New York Packet
Friday, December 28, 1787
[Alexander
Hamilton]
To the People of the State of New York:
IT HAS
been already observed that the federal government ought to possess the power of
providing for the support of the national forces; in which proposition was
intended to be included the expense of raising troops, of building and equipping
fleets, and all other expenses in any wise connected with military arrangements
and operations. But these are not the only objects to which the jurisdiction of
the Union, in respect to revenue, must necessarily be empowered to extend. It
must embrace a provision for the support of the national civil list; for the
payment of the national debts contracted, or that may be contracted; and, in
general, for all those matters which will call for disbursements out of the
national treasury. The conclusion is, that there must be interwoven, in the
frame of the government, a general power of taxation, in one shape or another.
Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital
principle of the body politic; as that which sustains its life and motion, and
enables it to perform its most essential functions. A complete power, therefore,
to procure a regular and adequate supply of it, as far as the resources of the
community will permit, may be regarded as an indispensable ingredient in every
constitution. From a deficiency in this particular, one of two evils must ensue;
either the people must be subjected to continual plunder, as a substitute for a
more eligible mode of supplying the public wants, or the government must sink
into a fatal atrophy, and, in a short course of time, perish.
In the Ottoman or Turkish empire, the sovereign, though in
other respects absolute master of the lives and fortunes of his subjects, has no
right to impose a new tax. The consequence is that he permits the bashaws or
governors of provinces to pillage the people without mercy; and, in turn,
squeezes out of them the sums of which he stands in need, to satisfy his own
exigencies and those of the state. In America, from a like cause, the government
of the Union has gradually dwindled into a state of decay, approaching nearly to
annihilation. Who can doubt, that the happiness of the people in both countries
would be promoted by competent authorities in the proper hands, to provide the
revenues which the necessities of the public might require?
The present Confederation, feeble as it is intended to
repose in the United States, an unlimited power of providing for the pecuniary
wants of the Union. But proceeding upon an erroneous principle, it has been done
in such a manner as entirely to have frustrated the intention. Congress, by the
articles which compose that compact (as has already been stated), are authorized
to ascertain and call for any sums of money necessary, in their judgment, to the
service of the United States; and their requisitions, if conformable to the rule
of apportionment, are in every constitutional sense obligatory upon the States.
These have no right to question the propriety of the demand; no discretion
beyond that of devising the ways and means of furnishing the sums demanded. But
though this be strictly and truly the case; though the assumption of such a
right would be an infringement of the articles of Union; though it may seldom or
never have been avowedly claimed, yet in practice it has been constantly
exercised, and would continue to be so, as long as the revenues of the
Confederacy should remain dependent on the intermediate agency of its members.
What the consequences of this system have been, is within the knowledge of every
man the least conversant in our public affairs, and has been amply unfolded in
different parts of these inquiries. It is this which has chiefly contributed to
reduce us to a situation, which affords ample cause both of mortification to
ourselves, and of triumph to our enemies.
What remedy can there be for this situation, but in a
change of the system which has produced it in a change of the fallacious and
delusive system of quotas and requisitions? What substitute can there be
imagined for this ignis fatuus in finance, but that of permitting the
national government to raise its own revenues by the ordinary methods of
taxation authorized in every well-ordered constitution of civil government?
Ingenious men may declaim with plausibility on any subject; but no human
ingenuity can point out any other expedient to rescue us from the inconveniences
and embarrassments naturally resulting from defective supplies of the public
treasury.
The more intelligent adversaries of the new Constitution
admit the force of this reasoning; but they qualify their admission by a
distinction between what they call internal and external
taxation. The former they would reserve to the State governments; the latter,
which they explain into commercial imposts, or rather duties on imported
articles, they declare themselves willing to concede to the federal head. This
distinction, however, would violate the maxim of good sense and sound policy,
which dictates that every POWER ought to be in
proportion to its
OBJECT; and would still leave the general government in
a kind of tutelage to the State governments, inconsistent with every idea of
vigor or efficiency. Who can pretend that commercial imposts are, or would be,
alone equal to the present and future exigencies of the Union? Taking into the
account the existing debt, foreign and domestic, upon any plan of extinguishment
which a man moderately impressed with the importance of public justice and
public credit could approve, in addition to the establishments which all parties
will acknowledge to be necessary, we could not reasonably flatter ourselves,
that this resource alone, upon the most improved scale, would even suffice for
its present necessities. Its future necessities admit not of calculation or
limitation; and upon the principle, more than once adverted to, the power of
making provision for them as they arise ought to be equally unconfined. I
believe it may be regarded as a position warranted by the history of mankind,
that, in the usual progress of things, the necessities of a nation, in every
stage of its existence, will be found at least equal to its resources.
To say that deficiencies may be provided for by
requisitions upon the States, is on the one hand to acknowledge that this system
cannot be depended upon, and on the other hand to depend upon it for every thing
beyond a certain limit. Those who have carefully attended to its vices and
deformities as they have been exhibited by experience or delineated in the
course of these papers, must feel invincible repugnancy to trusting the national
interests in any degree to its operation. Its inevitable tendency, whenever it
is brought into activity, must be to enfeeble the Union, and sow the seeds of
discord and contention between the federal head and its members, and between the
members themselves. Can it be expected that the deficiencies would be better
supplied in this mode than the total wants of the Union have heretofore been
supplied in the same mode? It ought to be recollected that if less will be
required from the States, they will have proportionably less means to answer the
demand. If the opinions of those who contend for the distinction which has been
mentioned were to be received as evidence of truth, one would be led to conclude
that there was some known point in the economy of national affairs at which it
would be safe to stop and to say: Thus far the ends of public happiness will be
promoted by supplying the wants of government, and all beyond this is unworthy
of our care or anxiety. How is it possible that a government half supplied and
always necessitous, can fulfill the purposes of its institution, can provide for
the security, advance the prosperity, or support the reputation of the
commonwealth? How can it ever possess either energy or stability, dignity or
credit, confidence at home or respectability abroad? How can its administration
be any thing else than a succession of expedients temporizing, impotent,
disgraceful? How will it be able to avoid a frequent sacrifice of its
engagements to immediate necessity? How can it undertake or execute any liberal
or enlarged plans of public good?
Let us attend to what would be the effects of this
situation in the very first war in which we should happen to be engaged. We will
presume, for argument's sake, that the revenue arising from the impost duties
answers the purposes of a provision for the public debt and of a peace
establishment for the Union. Thus circumstanced, a war breaks out. What would be
the probable conduct of the government in such an emergency? Taught by
experience that proper dependence could not be placed on the success of
requisitions, unable by its own authority to lay hold of fresh resources, and
urged by considerations of national danger, would it not be driven to the
expedient of diverting the funds already appropriated from their proper objects
to the defense of the State? It is not easy to see how a step of this kind could
be avoided; and if it should be taken, it is evident that it would prove the
destruction of public credit at the very moment that it was becoming essential
to the public safety. To imagine that at such a crisis credit might be dispensed
with, would be the extreme of infatuation. In the modern system of war, nations
the most wealthy are obliged to have recourse to large loans. A country so
little opulent as ours must feel this necessity in a much stronger degree. But
who would lend to a government that prefaced its overtures for borrowing by an
act which demonstrated that no reliance could be placed on the steadiness of its
measures for paying? The loans it might be able to procure would be as limited
in their extent as burdensome in their conditions. They would be made upon the
same principles that usurers commonly lend to bankrupt and fraudulent debtors,
with a sparing hand and at enormous premiums.
It may perhaps be imagined that, from the scantiness of
the resources of the country, the necessity of diverting the established funds
in the case supposed would exist, though the national government should possess
an unrestrained power of taxation. But two considerations will serve to quiet
all apprehension on this head: one is, that we are sure the resources of the
community, in their full extent, will be brought into activity for the benefit
of the Union; the other is, that whatever deficiences there may be, can without
difficulty be supplied by loans.
The power of creating new funds upon new objects of
taxation, by its own authority, would enable the national government to borrow
as far as its necessities might require. Foreigners, as well as the citizens of
America, could then reasonably repose confidence in its engagements; but to
depend upon a government that must itself depend upon thirteen other governments
for the means of fulfilling its contracts, when once its situation is clearly
understood, would require a degree of credulity not often to be met with in the
pecuniary transactions of mankind, and little reconcilable with the usual
sharp-sightedness of avarice.
Reflections of this kind may have trifling weight with
men who hope to see realized in America the halcyon scenes of the poetic or
fabulous age; but to those who believe we are likely to experience a common
portion of the vicissitudes and calamities which have fallen to the lot of other
nations, they must appear entitled to serious attention. Such men must behold
the actual situation of their country with painful solicitude, and deprecate the
evils which ambition or revenge might, with too much facility, inflict upon it.
PUBLIUS
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