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The Federalist No. 85
Concluding Remarks
Independent Journal
Wednesday, August 13, Saturday, August 16,
1788
[Alexander Hamilton]
To the People of the State of New York:
ACCORDING to the formal
division of the subject of these papers, announced in my first number, there
would appear still to remain for discussion two points: "the analogy of the
proposed government to your own State constitution," and "the
additional security which its adoption will afford to republican government, to
liberty, and to property." But these heads have been so fully anticipated
and exhausted in the progress of the work, that it would now scarcely be
possible to do any thing more than repeat, in a more dilated form, what has been
heretofore said, which the advanced stage of the question, and the time already
spent upon it, conspire to forbid.
It is remarkable, that the resemblance of the plan of the convention to the
act which organizes the government of this State holds, not less with regard to
many of the supposed defects, than to the real excellences of the former. Among
the pretended defects are the re-eligibility of the Executive, the want of a
council, the omission of a formal bill of rights, the omission of a provision
respecting the liberty of the press. These and several others which have been
noted in the course of our inquiries are as much chargeable on the existing
constitution of this State, as on the one proposed for the Union; and a man must
have slender pretensions to consistency, who can rail at the latter for
imperfections which he finds no difficulty in excusing in the former. Nor indeed
can there be a better proof of the insincerity and affectation of some of the
zealous adversaries of the plan of the convention among us, who profess to be
the devoted admirers of the government under which they live, than the fury with
which they have attacked that plan, for matters in regard to which our own
constitution is equally or perhaps more vulnerable.
The additional securities to republican government, to liberty and to
property, to be derived from the adoption of the plan under consideration,
consist chiefly in the restraints which the preservation of the Union will
impose on local factions and insurrections, and on the ambition of powerful
individuals in single States, who may acquire credit and influence enough, from
leaders and favorites, to become the despots of the people; in the diminution of
the opportunities to foreign intrigue, which the dissolution of the Confederacy
would invite and facilitate; in the prevention of extensive military
establishments, which could not fail to grow out of wars between the States in a
disunited situation; in the express guaranty of a republican form of government
to each; in the absolute and universal exclusion of titles of nobility; and in
the precautions against the repetition of those practices on the part of the
State governments which have undermined the foundations of property and credit,
have planted mutual distrust in the breasts of all classes of citizens, and have
occasioned an almost universal prostration of morals.
Thus have I, fellow-citizens, executed the task I had assigned to myself;
with what success, your conduct must determine. I trust at least you will admit
that I have not failed in the assurance I gave you respecting the spirit with
which my endeavors should be conducted. I have addressed myself purely to your
judgments, and have studiously avoided those asperities which are too apt to
disgrace political disputants of all parties, and which have been not a little
provoked by the language and conduct of the opponents of the Constitution. The
charge of a conspiracy against the liberties of the people, which has been
indiscriminately brought against the advocates of the plan, has something in it
too wanton and too malignant, not to excite the indignation of every man who
feels in his own bosom a refutation of the calumny. The perpetual changes which
have been rung upon the wealthy, the well-born, and the great, have been such as
to inspire the disgust of all sensible men. And the unwarrantable concealments
and misrepresentations which have been in various ways practiced to keep the
truth from the public eye, have been of a nature to demand the reprobation of
all honest men. It is not impossible that these circumstances may have
occasionally betrayed me into intemperances of expression which I did not
intend; it is certain that I have frequently felt a struggle between sensibility
and moderation; and if the former has in some instances prevailed, it must be my
excuse that it has been neither often nor much.
Let us now pause and ask ourselves whether, in the course of these papers,
the proposed Constitution has not been satisfactorily vindicated from the
aspersions thrown upon it; and whether it has not been shown to be worthy of the
public approbation, and necessary to the public safety and prosperity. Every man
is bound to answer these questions to himself, according to the best of his
conscience and understanding, and to act agreeably to the genuine and sober
dictates of his judgment. This is a duty from which nothing can give him a
dispensation. 'T is one that he is called upon, nay, constrained by all the
obligations that form the bands of society, to discharge sincerely and honestly.
No partial motive, no particular interest, no pride of opinion, no temporary
passion or prejudice, will justify to himself, to his country, or to his
posterity, an improper election of the part he is to act. Let him beware of an
obstinate adherence to party; let him reflect that the object upon which he is
to decide is not a particular interest of the community, but the very existence
of the nation; and let him remember that a majority of America has already given
its sanction to the plan which he is to approve or reject.
I shall not dissemble that I feel an entire confidence in the arguments
which recommend the proposed system to your adoption, and that I am unable to
discern any real force in those by which it has been opposed. I am persuaded
that it is the best which our political situation, habits, and opinions will
admit, and superior to any the revolution has produced.
Concessions on the part of the friends of the plan, that it has not a claim
to absolute perfection, have afforded matter of no small triumph to its enemies.
"Why," say they, "should we adopt an imperfect thing? Why not
amend it and make it perfect before it is irrevocably established?" This
may be plausible enough, but it is only plausible. In the first place I remark,
that the extent of these concessions has been greatly exaggerated. They have
been stated as amounting to an admission that the plan is radically defective,
and that without material alterations the rights and the interests of the
community cannot be safely confided to it. This, as far as I have understood the
meaning of those who make the concessions, is an entire perversion of their
sense. No advocate of the measure can be found, who will not declare as his
sentiment, that the system, though it may not be perfect in every part, is, upon
the whole, a good one; is the best that the present views and circumstances of
the country will permit; and is such an one as promises every species of
security which a reasonable people can desire.
I answer in the next place, that I should esteem it the extreme of
imprudence to prolong the precarious state of our national affairs, and to
expose the Union to the jeopardy of successive experiments, in the chimerical
pursuit of a perfect plan. I never expect to see a perfect work from imperfect
man. The result of the deliberations of all collective bodies must necessarily
be a compound, as well of the errors and prejudices, as of the good sense and
wisdom, of the individuals of whom they are composed. The compacts which are to
embrace thirteen distinct States in a common bond of amity and union, must as
necessarily be a compromise of as many dissimilar interests and inclinations.
How can perfection spring from such materials?
The reasons assigned in an excellent little pamphlet lately published in
this city,1 are
unanswerable to show the utter improbability of assembling a new convention,
under circumstances in any degree so favorable to a happy issue, as those in
which the late convention met, deliberated, and concluded. I will not repeat the
arguments there used, as I presume the production itself has had an extensive
circulation. It is certainly well worthy the perusal of every friend to his
country. There is, however, one point of light in which the subject of
amendments still remains to be considered, and in which it has not yet been
exhibited to public view. I cannot resolve to conclude without first taking a
survey of it in this aspect.
It appears to me susceptible of absolute demonstration, that it will be far
more easy to obtain subsequent than previous amendments to the Constitution. The
moment an alteration is made in the present plan, it becomes, to the purpose of
adoption, a new one, and must undergo a new decision of each State. To its
complete establishment throughout the Union, it will therefore require the
concurrence of thirteen States. If, on the contrary, the Constitution proposed
should once be ratified by all the States as it stands, alterations in it may at
any time be effected by nine States. Here, then, the chances are as thirteen to
nine2 in favor of
subsequent amendment, rather than of the original adoption of an entire system.
This is not all. Every Constitution for the United States must inevitably
consist of a great variety of particulars, in which thirteen independent States
are to be accommodated in their interests or opinions of interest. We may of
course expect to see, in any body of men charged with its original formation,
very different combinations of the parts upon different points. Many of those
who form a majority on one question, may become the minority on a second, and an
association dissimilar to either may constitute the majority on a third. Hence
the necessity of moulding and arranging all the particulars which are to compose
the whole, in such a manner as to satisfy all the parties to the compact; and
hence, also, an immense multiplication of difficulties and casualties in
obtaining the collective assent to a final act. The degree of that
multiplication must evidently be in a ratio to the number of particulars and the
number of parties.
But every amendment to the Constitution, if once established, would be a
single proposition, and might be brought forward singly. There would then be no
necessity for management or compromise, in relation to any other point -- no
giving nor taking. The will of the requisite number would at once bring the
matter to a decisive issue. And consequently, whenever nine, or rather ten
States, were united in the desire of a particular amendment, that amendment must
infallibly take place. There can, therefore, be no comparison between the
facility of affecting an amendment, and that of establishing in the first
instance a complete Constitution.
In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments, it has been urged
that the persons delegated to the administration of the national government will
always be disinclined to yield up any portion of the authority of which they
were once possessed. For my own part I acknowledge a thorough conviction that
any amendments which may, upon mature consideration, be thought useful, will be
applicable to the organization of the government, not to the mass of its powers;
and on this account alone, I think there is no weight in the observation just
stated. I also think there is little weight in it on another account. The
intrinsic difficulty of governing THIRTEEN STATES at any
rate, independent of calculations upon an ordinary degree of public spirit and
integrity, will, in my opinion constantly impose on the national rulers
the necessity of a spirit of accommodation to the reasonable
expectations of their constituents. But there is yet a further consideration,
which proves beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the observation is futile.
It is this that the national rulers, whenever nine States concur, will have no
option upon the subject. By the fifth article of the plan, the Congres will be
obliged "on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of
the States [which at present amount to nine], to call a convention for proposing
amendments, which shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as part
of the Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the
States, or by conventions in three fourths thereof." The words of this
article are peremptory. The Congress "shall call a convention."
Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body. And of
consequence, all the declamation about the disinclination to a change vanishes
in air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite two thirds or three
fourths of the State legislatures, in amendments which may affect local
interests, can there be any room to apprehend any such difficulty in a union on
points which are merely relative to the general liberty or security of the
people. We may safely rely on the disposition of the State legislatures to erect
barriers against the encroachments of the national authority.
If the foregoing argument is a fallacy, certain it is that I am myself
deceived by it, for it is, in my conception, one of those rare instances in
which a political truth can be brought to the test of a mathematical
demonstration. Those who see the matter in the same light with me, however
zealous they may be for amendments, must agree in the propriety of a previous
adoption, as the most direct road to their own object.
The zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the establishment of the
Constitution, must abate in every man who is ready to accede to the truth of the
following observations of a writer equally solid and ingenious: "To balance
a large state or society [says he], whether monarchical or republican, on
general laws, is a work of so great difficulty, that no human genius, however
comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it.
The judgments of many must unite in the work; EXPERIENCE
must guide their labor; TIME must bring it to
perfection, and the FEELING of inconveniences must
correct the mistakes which they inevitably fall into in their first
trials and experiments."3
These judicious reflections contain a lesson of moderation to all the sincere
lovers of the Union, and ought to put them upon their guard against hazarding
anarchy, civil war, a perpetual alienation of the States from each other, and
perhaps the military despotism of a victorious demagogue, in the pursuit of what
they are not likely to obtain, but from TIME and
EXPERIENCE. It may be in me a defect of political
fortitude, but I acknowledge that I cannot entertain an equal tranquillity with
those who affect to treat the dangers of a longer continuance in our present
situation as imaginary. A NATION, without a
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, is, in my view, an awful spectacle.
The establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by the voluntary
ocnsent of a whole people, is a PRODIGY, to the
completion of which I look forward with trembling anxiety. I can reconcile it to
no rules of prudence to let go the hold we now have, in so arduous an
enterprise, upon seven out of the thirteen States, and after having passed over
so considerable a part of the ground, to recommence the course. I dread the more
the consequences of new attempts, because I know that POWERFUL
INDIVIDUALS, in this and in other States, are enemies to a general
national government in every possible shape.
PUBLIUS
1. Entitled "An Address to the
People of the State of New York."
2. It may rather be said TEN,
for though two thirds may set on foot the measure, three fourths must ratify.
3. Hume's Essays, Vol. I, p. 128:
"The Rise of Arts and Sciences."
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